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ABSTRACT 
Learning from other people’s accidents and misfortune is not a novel accident prevention 
strategy.  The benefits of such learning are obvious. What is not so obvious, however, is 
how to provide institutional support and how to set up systems that facilitate such 
learning.  
We examine the European Union’s Major Accident Reporting System (MARS), which is 
created in conjunction with the EU regulatory instruments to prevent major industrial 
accidents, the Seveso-directive.  We review some of the general requirements that a 
successful reporting system must meet and suggest that MARS may not live up to the 
noble intentions behind its creation.  
Our case example is a simple methanol tank storage installation which we believe can be 
found in most if not all EU member states.  We demonstrate that the data in some of the 
Short Reports in MARS have a number of serious shortcomings.  Causes are not 
identified and lessons learned are left blank.  We argue that there are substantial 
opportunities foregone in the EU system that provides institutional support to learning 
from past experience.   
Over the course of 22 years the EU database has only accumulated about 600 Short 
Reports for all its member states.  We consider it unlikely that this number represents all 
“major accidents” according to a common sense definition of this concept for such a large 
territory.  We speculate if legal scope limitations may be counter productive and perhaps 
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even self-defeating for the Seveso legislation’s stated objective of accident prevention 
through information sharing.   
We compare MARS with a commercially available accident database.  While the two 
reporting systems suffer from the same fundamental shortcomings the commercial system 
is marginally superior to MARS.  We conclude by emphasising that the value of accident 
reporting schemes is not only determined by the quality of the data they contain but that 
institutional support appears to be crucial to sheer survivability.   
INTRODUCTION 
Preface 
In this paper we examine man's perhaps oldest accident prevention strategy: learning 
from past mistakes.  In its modern form the key characteristics of this strategy are that 
past mishaps shall be recorded and analysed to extract lessons learned which in turn shall 
be disseminated through broad feedback loops in order to prevent future similar, and not 
just identical, accidents.   
Evolutionary learning 
Man has learned from his mistakes from ages past.  Petroski (1992, 1994, 2006) has 
identified this type of learning as a type of quasi-Darwinian evolutionary learning and 
has shown this to be of major importance in the history of development of structural 
engineering.  He identifies evolutionary learning in the construction of the Pyramids 
some 4,000 years ago, in the evolution of steel truss bridges in the late 1800s and  
suspension bridges in the 1900s. In each case hubris and complacency push successful 
principles of construction to the limits of failure which in turn spurs the development of 
improved designs. 
A failure therefore provides invaluable insights that cannot be obtained from other 
means.   Indeed, the history of structural engineering is better understood from its 
spectacular failures than from its spectacular successes.  For a failed structure provides a 
counter example to a hypothesis and shows incontrovertibly what cannot be done, while a 
structure that stands without incident often conceals whatever lesson or caveats it might 
hold for the next generation.  We can learn more from one structure that failed than from 
a thousand structures that stand.  Success may be grand, but disappointment can often 
teach us more.  
There is a parallel here to the philosopher of science, Karl Popper (2002/1959), who 
argued that falsifiability – and not verifiability – is the hallmark of science.  Thus, a 
theory is scientific only if it is in principle capable of being falsified or refuted; in 
contrast, a scientific theory can never be shown to be true, Popper argued.  Therefore, 
refutations are crucial to scientific progress: a refutation is a single instance (an 
observation or experiment) that counts against a theory.  Similarly, it may be suggested, a 
design is, in this sense, like a theory: the design “states” that for all intended use 
conditions it will remain sufficiently robust.  A design failure is a refutation: we have 
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observed a situation, which is within the intended use conditions, where the design has 
failed.  Here we refer explicitly to the deliberately vague notion of “intended use 
conditions”.  Of course, it is easy to imagine conditions of use that would cause the 
design to break or fail but which are outside the scope of intended use conditions.  
Conditions will vary and for a given design perhaps most conditions are clement and do 
not challenge its robustness.  However, the most important lessons come from 
refutations, demonstrations or real-world episodes that show the weaknesses of a design.   
The good news of evolutionary learning is that failures should be valued as unique 
learning opportunities.  The bad news is the cost associated with failure.  Evidently, it 
makes good sense to share the lessons learned from unwanted outcomes in order to 
minimize the number of times the same lessons have to be learned.  This straightforward 
thinking is reflected in common in common sayings such as Santanyana’s : “Those who 
cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it”. 
Institutional support to reduce the cost of evolutionary learning 
Perhaps because the aim is so self-evidently rational and noble, much effort has been 
directed towards promoting the exchange of lessons learned.   
The ability and willingness to learn from incidents and accidents are not uniformly the 
same across sectors and cultures. Thus, civil aviation has been a leader in this area ever 
since non-punitive incident reporting schemes were set up some 30 years ago (Orlady & 
Orlady, 1999)   Moreover, a number of international and national organisations make 
freely available safety related research, including analyses of accidents and trends. For 
instance, the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF), which is an “independent, nonprofit, 
international organization engaged in research, auditing, education, advocacy and 
publishing to improve aviation safety” (www.flightsafety.org). Among FSF serial 
publications is the widely known Flight Safety Digest appearing in 10 issues annually. 
Eurocontrol (the European body for coordinating air traffic control) is another trans-
national body which is funding, inter alia, research and studies related to safety. 
More recently, serious efforts have been directed at including not only unwanted events, 
i.e. accidents, but also precursors to unwanted events; precursors which resulted in no 
harm but under slightly different circumstances could have done so.  See for instance 
NRC (2004).] 
Within major industrial accident prevention several initiatives exist.  The Loss Prevention 
Bulletin published by the UK Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE) stands out as a 
particularly bright beacon with its persistent dedication to the ideals of information 
sharing.  The contributions of Trevor Kletz from the same institution are also difficult not 
to mention (1988, 1990, 1993).  The title of a recent book “Still going wrong” (Kletz 
2003), however, is indicative that serious barriers to learning from experience exist in 
practical life.  See also Kletz (2004) 
In addition, several initiative and databases exist in many countries to support this type of 
learning (Kirchsteiger 1999a).  Probably every large multinational petrochemical or 
chemical company has a proprietary information system where unwanted events are 
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registered and analysed to prevent recurrence.  A few large companies have donated their 
incident registrations to the IChemE which, after being anonymised, are included in the 
commercially available “The Accident Database” (TAD). (Smith 2006, personal 
communication). Besides these commercial initiatives, government funded initiatives 
exist.  Of specific importance to this paper is the EU funded database, MARS. 
The EU MARS accident database 
One of the requirements of the European Union’s Council Directive 96/82/EC (“Seveso 
II”) is that the authorities in the Member States report all major accidents involving 
dangerous substances and falling under the provisions of the Directive to the European 
Commission.  The objective is to use this information as a basis from which to draw 
lessons-learned for preventing major accidents and mitigating their consequences. For 
this purpose, the Commission has set up in 1984 an industrial accident notification 
scheme, the Major Accident Reporting System (MARS), operated and maintained by the 
Major Accident Hazards Bureau (MAHB) of the Commission’s Joint Research Centre in 
Ispra (Italy).  In addition to supporting the purposes of reporting under the EU Seveso 
Directive, the MARS tool is used by OECD members countries and UN/ECE signatories 
to report industrial accidents under the OECD Chemical Accidents Programme and the 
UN-ECE Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, respectively. 
Obviously, the MARS scheme depends entirely on member countries to actually deliver 
useful input. 
MARS is dedicated to collect data in a consistent way, to analyse and statistically process 
them, and to create subsets of all non-confidential accidents data and analysis results for 
export to all Member States. In its new version 4.0, MARS represents a modern 
information exchange and analysis tool.  It can serve both as data logging systems and, 
on different levels of complexity, as data analysis tools. (Kirchsteiger 2001a, 2001b) 
The contribution of the MARS system to accident prevention has been recognized in 
several papers (Rasmussen 1996, Kirchsteiger et al. 1999).  The information in the 
MARS system has been subject to complex data analysis to identify trends, precursor 
information, and the contribution of human error, amongst others, using descriptive and 
Bayesian statistical methods.  (Kirchsteiger 1997, 1999).  There are recommendations 
also to report near-miss incidents to MARS on a voluntary basis (Jones et al. 1999).  As a 
crude measure of the level of academic interest in MARS we searched Google Scholar 
for “Major Accident Reporting System” in mid-August 2006.  The search returned 110 
scientific citations. 
In the following we will take up a specific example to illustrate some of the problems in 
using the MARS database in industrial accident prevention.   
The case example – bulk methanol storage 
The case installation is very simple, the bulk storage of methanol in a fixed roof tank.  
We consider it likely that similar, if not identical installations exist in all EU member 
states.  Consequently we regard it a prime candidate for evolutionary learning supported 
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by information sharing –any lessons learned in one member state are likely to be relevant 
to other member states. 
Our case draws on practical experience of the first author with risk analysis of industrial 
activities.  In 1994 a company (“company A”) sought permission to store 2,000 m3 
(1,580 ton) of methanol in an existing fixed roof tank in the industrial area in a harbour in 
Denmark.  The tank had earlier stored gasoline.   Methanol is classified as “toxic” and the 
planned inventory exceeded the then Seveso I Directive’s column 3 limit of 200 ton for 
toxic substances, placing the installation in the so-called Seveso upper-tier, which 
requires a safety report to be submitted to the authorities1
A similar sequence of events took place 11 years later, in 2005.  Another company 
(“company B”) sought authority permission to store a similar quantity of methanol in a 
fixed roof tank in a tank farm in the industrial area of another harbour in Denmark.  In 
this case, the CA, not related to the first CA, assessed the safety report submitted by the 
company without using consultants.  The CA found the consequence analysis lacking and 
specified some leak and fire scenarios for which safety distances should be computed.  
Company B hired a consultant for this task.  The present first author was not involved in 
this case. 
.  The county - which in this 
case was the coordinating Competent Authority (CA) - was inexperienced with this type 
of installation and sought advice from a risk analysis consultant to review the information 
in the safety report.  Company A had not identified any particular risks in the safety 
report and had no reason for concern, as it had no knowledge of any prior accidents with 
bulk methanol storage.  The consultant [the present first author] started the review by 
requesting a search of the MARS database for accidents involving methanol.  The search 
was carried out by JRC staff, who returned anonymised accident information. 
The uses of information from incidents and accidents  
A number of safety analysts have analysed and described the uses and benefits of 
information derived from incident and accident reports (e.g., Orlady & Orlady 1998, 
Schaaf 1991, Johnson 2003).  Schaaf et al. suggest that knowledge of prior accidents (a) 
can improve our model, (b) can be used for monitoring; and (c) can be used for 
motivation.  Modifying this framework to some extent, we suggest that accident and 
incident information serves four overall goals that we may summarise as: Overview, 
modelling, motivation and alerts 
 Overview is provided when reports are aggregated, and patterns and trends are 
identified via descriptive statistics. Analysts and users have to be careful, 
however, since incident reporting may possibly be biased (for instance, it may not 
give a true picture of violations) 
                                                 
 
1  According to the then version of the Seveso I directive in force in 1994.  In the Seveso II directive, 
methanol is now listed as a specific substance with column 2 and 3 values of  500 and 5,000 tons 
respectively.  Today (2006) Company A would therefore be a lower-tier installation not required to submit 
a safety report. (EU, 2003, Annex 1, part 1) 
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 Modelling is about forming a mental model of how causal mechanisms operate - 
how things can go wrong. This is based on narrative reports or even a single 
report of an accident or incident that shows operators and analysts how the 
interplay of actions and events may lead to danger and perhaps calamity. Model 
insight involves the user cognitively, revealing how things may go wrong. 
 Motivation is gained when a user realizes that this could happen to me (or to our 
unit). Like insight, motivation is typically derived from narrative account of a 
single case  
 Alerts, finally, are concrete instructions or reminders that specific devices require 
specific maintenance or procedural operations. The utility and meaning of such 
alerts do not depend on a full narrative report or any specific context at all, but 
they are nearly always prompted by one or several concrete incidents or accidents. 
 DATA 
Introduction 
The case we are going to describe is based on a concrete risk assessment task performed 
in 1994.  The results of the original 1994 MARS search have been lost but we have been 
able to retrieve the information again in our 2006 search (database records numbers 113 
and 233).  
MARS methanol accident search 
Two types of reports are available in the MARS system, Short Reports and Full Reports. 
A Short Report contains available information on the event known at an early time after 
the occurrence.  The so-called Full Report develops in detail the basic information given 
in the Short Report.  Apart from data quality, the basic acceptance criterion for an 
accident to be included in MARS is that at least the report profile and the Short Report 
have been completed. (Kirchsteiger 1997).  Short Reports are anonymised. 
Only Short Reports can be searched on the MARS website.  The Short Reports are 
indexed according to a comprehensive classification scheme which permits Boolean 
searches.  It is not possible to carry out a free text search across all fields and all reports.  
The search was therefore carried out specifying “methanol” in the fields 
“AccTypeDescription” OR “SubstDescription”.  The search returned 19 results (June 7, 
2006).  Because a free text search is not possible, there is a slight possibility that the 
MARS database could contain other records relevant to methanol accidents, but where 
the term "methanol" is given in other fields than the two we searched although we 
consider this unlikely.  The majority of Short Reports that were produced by the search 
concern the use of methanol in chemical synthesis, and only two records ( #113 and 
#233) are relevant to the bulk storage of methanol.  Here we give excerpts of key 
information for each of these records.  Quotes from the reports are verbatim, remarks by 
present authors are inserted in brackets.  
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Short Report #113 concerns an explosion of a methanol tank on June 27, 1994.  Only 
the most basic information is provided in the report.  
Accident Type:  During a summer thunder-storm in a storage tank, which was filled 
with 354,000 kg (354 tonnes) of Methanol, an explosion occurred due to the fall of a 
lightning stroke (external event).   
Substance(s) Directly Involved: Methanol ca. 8000 kg (8 tonnes). 
Immediate Source(s) of Accident. : During a summer thunder-storm in a storage 
tank, which was filled with 354,000 kg (354 tonnes) of Methanol, an explosion 
occurred due to a lightning stroke (external event).  
Suspected Cause(s):  Lightning, external event   
Immediate Lessons Learned:  [none provided] 
Discussion: The description simply states that a methanol tank exploded during a thunder 
storm.  There was no injury to people but the tank and its contents were destroyed.  The 
Lessons Learned field is blank and there is no further mention of causes or accident 
mechanisms.   
Short Report #233 is, in contrast to #113, rich in information and concerns a series of 
tank explosions and fires on May 15, 1987.   
Accident Type:  [M]ost likely the empty tank No 43 exploded first causing the 
explosions of tanks No 44 and 45. The explosions of tanks No 44 and 45 were 
followed by the fire of the contained methanol. [...] Probably the explosion was 
caused by the ignition of a mixture of residual methanol vapours with air formed 
during the degassing operations of tank No 43 (it was degassed with air in order to 
recover nonane). 
Immediate Source(s) of Accident: The accident occurred in a coastal petrochemical 
storage installation. The installation was [located] 20 metres […] from the rail-way 
[...] and close to a school and other residential buildings. [...]  Tank No 43 had 
previously contained methanol but, when the accident occurred, was practically 
empty and had to be decontaminated to receive subsequently nonane. Tanks No 44 
and 45 were filled with pure methanol. 
Immediate Effects:  4 people were killed and 1 injured [...]. No one outside the 
installation was injured. The explosion and the following fire caused the destruction 
of: storage tanks, pipelines, window panes, doors and factory fence. Outside the 
installation the explosion caused the breakage of the windows and a slight 
deformation of the doors of the nearby buildings.   
Immediate Lessons Learned:  It is believed preventive measures will also be taken 
for similar installations, which may include: 1- the improvement of the internal 
safety organization; 2- the installation of sensors [… to]  monitor the concentration 
of dangerous substances in the air, connected with alarm systems; 3- setting up of 
work-permit procedures; 4- the use of well-trained personnel. Measures to mitigate 
the effects of the accident: 1- locating plants at a safe distance from other activities.   
Discussion:  The accident occurred in a petrochemical storage installation located 20 
metres away from a railway, close to a school and other residential buildings which were 
damaged by the explosions.  It appears that tank no 43 was being taken out of methanol 
storage service.  This involved a “degassing operation” in which the methanol vapours in 
the tank are purged with air.  The initial explosion occurred during the degassing 
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operation, spread to two other methanol tanks, which then also exploded.  The degassing 
operation appears to have been carried out without efforts to prevent the formation of 
ignitable vapours.  The probable, though unsuccessful, accident prevention strategy 
appears to have been elimination of sources of ignition rather than preventing the 
formation of ignitable vapours.  There is no mention of the possible sources of ignition. 
Summarising the two, the MARS search provides a hint that bulk methanol storage 
appears to be associated with tank internal explosion hazards.  This is most apparent in 
MARS report #113 in which a tank explodes when struck by lightning.  The implications 
of MARS report #233 are less obvious as the case concerns an intrinsically unsafe 
degassing operation using air.  It appears reasonable to conclude that the first explosion 
in tank no. 43 was directly attributable to the unsafe degassing operation.  It is less clear 
if the subsequent explosions in the two other methanol storage tanks were also caused by 
the degassing operation, or whether they were caused by any intrinsic hazards of 
methanol.  In essence, the MARS search provides two cases where methanol tanks have 
exploded. 
Some problems with extent of information provided 
Among the other 17 reports, two records stand out, namely items #5 and #6, not because 
they are relevant for the bulk storage of methanol but because they indirectly may point 
to a weaknesses of the data in the MARS system.  Again, we give verbatim quotes, and 
phrases in brackets are corrections of misspellings or remarks by the authors of this 
paper. 
Short Report #5 concerns an explosion on August 13, 2003 in a production line for 
glyoxylic acid:   
Accident Type:  Explosion in a production line for glyoxylic acid (CAS 298-12-4) 
with subsequent fire; in the installation various relevant substances were present 
(methanol, hydrogen, peroxides). 20 workers were injured, 1 of them had to be kept 
in hospital. The part of the installation which contained the production line was 
completely destroyed, missile range ca. 150 m   
Substance(s) Directly Involved:  [Glyoxylic] acid has no classification related to 
Seveso II but so have other substances present in the installation (methanol, 
hydrogen, peroxides)   
Immediate Source(s) of Accident: The process involves ozone and is known to be 
extremely exothermic under [c]ertain  conditions - it is assumed that it was a 
runaway reaction 
Suspected Cause(s):  Unclear  
Immediate Lessons Learned. Unclear, despite intense efforts to find the causes no 
concrete cause known yet; the inspecting authority has closed the installation until 
further notice in this respect   
Discussion:  First, the consequences of this accident are substantial.  The production line 
was completely destroyed by an explosion, 20 workers were injured and the “missile 
range” was approximately 150 m.  This event is beyond doubt a “major accident” 
according to common sense definition of this concept.  Yet, it is important to observe the 
statement that “glyoxylic acid has no classification related to Seveso II but so have other 
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substances present at the installation (methanol, hydrogen, peroxides)”.  We speculate if 
it could be the involvement or perhaps even the mere presence of these other substances, 
related or unrelated to the causes of the accident, that caused this incident to be reported 
to the MARS database2
Second, the “Immediate Lessons Learned” field is inconclusive.  Little is known about 
causes, although some sort of runaway reaction is suspected.  We are informed that the 
inspecting authority has closed the installation until further notice. 
.    
Short Report #6 concerns an explosion on August 9, 2004 in a production line for 
glyoxylic acid: 
Accident Type:  Explosion in a production line for glyoxylic acid (the same 
installation was already subject to report a major accident one year before) - causes 
are not known yet   
Substance(s) Directly Involved:  Methanol (CAS 67-56-1), various peroxides   
Immediate Source(s) of Accident: The accident happened in the ozonification unit 
during start-up; this unit is established in a separate building for cooling purpose   
Suspected Cause(s):  Unknown so far   
Immediate Lessons Learned:  Still subject to discussion since the installation was 
reopened recently before the accident after additional [measures] were taken because 
of the accident in the year before   
Discussion:  This is the same installation that suffered a similar, if not identical accident, 
one year before.  It is noteworthy that the causes of the explosions are still not known.  
The new explosion appears to have happened shortly after the installation was reopened 
after the first explosion. 
Summarising the glyoxylic acid case we make two points.  First, it is not apparent from 
the short reports whether the underlying causes of each of the two explosions have been 
identified or if they merely have not been reported to MARS.  The fact that a new 
explosion occurred in the same plant could suggest that no lessons have been learned.  In 
any case, our key observation is that the publicly available information in Short Reports 
#5 and #6 has very limited use in practical accident prevention work.  Second, we 
speculate if there may be a possible weakness concerning “scope criteria”, i.e., the 
criteria that define which types of accidents must be reported to the MARS database.  Our 
concern is the obvious damage potential, the “complete destruction” of the production 
line and a “missile range” of 150 meter.  The culprit substance has not been identified 
and could be glyoxylic acid, peroxides, ozone or something else.  It is also possible that 
the culprit is not a specific substance but a special type of reaction chemistry that has an 
                                                 
 
2  This is a reminder that major industrial accidents are not required to be reported to the MARS database 
unless they meet et least one of a set of specific criteria laid down in Annex VI of the Seveso II directive.  
One criteria is if the accident involves substances that are classified under the Seveso II directive and the 
release exceed 5% of the Column 3 quantity.  Other criteria are: a death, six persons injured within the 
establishment and hospitalized for at least 24 hours, one person injured outside the establishment and 
hospitalized for at least 24 hours, permanent or long-term damage to 1 hectare or more of a lake or pond, 
damage to property in the establishment exceeding ECU 2 million, amongst others. 
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inherent runaway potential.  What concerns us most though, is the statement that 
“glyoxylic acid has no classification related to Seveso II but so have other substances 
present in the installation”  We are left with a slight uncertainty whether this incident, 
which beyond doubt is a "major accident", under some marginally different 
circumstances would be reportable according to a strict legal interpretation of the scope 
criteria of MARS and Seveso II regulations.  
TAD methanol accident search 
Because our topic of interest is institutional support to evolutionary learning we wished 
to compare a privately funded accident database with the government funded MARS 
initiative.   We conducted a small search in the commercially available TAD (The 
Accident Database) which is operated by and may be obtained from IChemeE in the UK.  
The search parameter “methanol” in free text returned 129 records.  Examination of these 
records reveals 16 cases which are specifically relevant for the bulk storage of methanol.  
Of these, 11 cases involve an internal explosion in the tank. 
Examples are given below [misspellings corrected in brackets]: 
TAD record #1145. March 28, 1976, Addyston, Ohio, USA.  “Lightning struck 600,000 
gallon storage tank containing methanol.  Walls separated from base and tank lifted 80 ft.  
Bund overflowed and [damage] caused to acrolonitrile tank.  Both tanks ignited.  
Explosion, fire, damage to equipment”. 
TAD record #3950. July 12, 1995, Tampa, Florida, USA:  “Lightning struck a tank of 
methanol causing fire.  One nearby tank filled with solvent reached its boiling point and 
blew its lid but the blaze was contained.  The methanol tank had a 250,000 gallon 
capacity but was only holding 40,000 gallons when struck.” 
TAD record #5638.  April 15, 1992, Wilmington;  North Carolina, USA.  Tank vapours 
ignited resulting in fire and explosion in storage tank containing 340 000 litres of 
methanol.  Cause not known. Some methanol spilt into nearby river and there was fear 
after breaching stepped bank. 
Discussion:  The direct results of this search are broadly in line with the results of the 
MARS search, indicating internal explosion hazards of methanol tanks. Several of the 
TAD reports involve spontaneous explosions in methanol storage tanks, both in fixed 
installations and marine transportation accidents.  Lightening strike is stated as the 
immediate cause in several cases.  
Like MARS, many of the records in TAD give very sparse information on causes.  
Superficial accident investigation/reporting appears to be a universal phenomenon.  
However, we consider the TAD search result  to be marginally more useful than the 
MARS search result because there are more observations corroborating  our suspicion of 
methanol tanks being associated with internal explosion hazards.  Several of the TAD 
cases are also described in somewhat more detail than are MARS records. 
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DISCUSSION 
General explosion hazards involving bulk storage of flammable liquid 
Many years of practical experience have accumulated regarding the prevention of 
explosion hazards in the bulk storage of flammable liquids.  Explosions in cone roof 
tanks containing gasoline are extremely rare.  The reason for this is that quality and 
performance specifications for motor gasoline set a relatively high vapour pressure, 
useful when we wish to start a cold engine.  Volatile fractions in the gasoline will 
therefore quickly evaporate leading to too high concentrations of gasoline vapour in the 
vapour space of the tank.   
In technical terms, if the concentration exceeds the upper flammable limit (UFL), vapours 
are no longer ignitable – the vapours are too rich.  Likewise, if the concentration drops 
below the lower flammable limit (LFL), vapours are not ignitable – they are too lean.  
Flammable vapours are only ignitable if their concentration falls within the LFL to UEL 
range.  Ignitable vapours are intrinsically unsafe as they only wait for a source of ignition 
to explode violently.  Experience has shown that it is extremely difficult to eliminate all 
sources of ignition. 
Normal tank operations can influence the concentration of vapours in the tank.  When a 
tank is being emptied or filled, the liquid in the tank acts as a piston that sucks in air or 
expels tank vapours through the tank vent – sometimes referred to as tank breathing.  If 
product is being withdrawn from a gasoline tank rapidly, tank vapours may temporarily 
become ignitable due to the large inflow of air caused by tank breathing.  When a 
gasoline tank is being filled, tank breathing expels flammable vapours that will be diluted 
and pass through the UFL-LFL range.  If ignited, there will be a flame at the tank vent, 
but the flame cannot travel back into the tank vapour space because concentrations there 
are too rich. Except in extreme cases with substantial tank breathing, vapours in gasoline 
tanks are always too rich.  This is also the reason why explosions in car fuel tanks are 
unheard of.   
Nowadays, the preferred storage of gasoline and other high vapour pressure flammable 
liquids involves floating roof tanks in which the tank vapour space is eliminated.  
Floating roof tanks greatly reduce the emission of volatile organic chemicals (VOC) and 
are often installed for environmental reasons.  Such tanks have their own hazards 
however, which fall outside the scope of this paper.   
The hazards of gasoline tanks are relevant to the example discussed in this paper because 
both tanks referred to in the section The case example were cone roof tanks that had 
earlier been in gasoline service.  Local experience and knowledge therefore supported an 
uncomplicated and straightforward fire prevention case – it was simply a change of one 
flammable liquid for another.  The only perceived significant change was that methanol, 
unlike gasoline, is classified as toxic.  Seveso I legislation supported this interpretation.  
The 1994 methanol storage tank was subject to Seveso legislation, not because of 
methanol’s flammability classification, but because of its toxicity classification. 
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Using MARS data in industrial accident prevention efforts 
At face value, the two MARS search results are disappointing from an accident 
prevention point of view.  Short Report #113 states no other causes than lightning strike.  
But this information is of little practical use in accident prevention, because the 
construction details and the operating conditions of the tank are not stated.  For instance, 
if the tank was equipped with a standard gooseneck vent, this might explain how ignited 
vapours could travel back into the tank.  Further questions then arise: e.g., was there a 
flame-arrester in the gooseneck?  Information on operating conditions would also have 
been very useful.  For instance, if the tank was being emptied, tank breathing could 
explain the presence of an ignitable mixture within the tank.   
Short Report 233 conveys little useful generally applicable accident prevention 
information despite the rich text description.  Degassing a tank with air is an extreme and 
inherently unsafe operation because tank vapours are likely to be in the ignitable range.  
But this hazard scenario has little general value for other tanks that are not degassed. 
MARS data provides insights into unidentified hazards (improved system 
modelling) 
The lightning strike information in Short Report #113 led the first author to realize (in 
1994, when the original risk assessment was made) that methanol had very different 
properties from gasoline.  The vapour pressure is lower and the flammable range is 
broader as seen in Table 1.   
 Vapour pressure *) LFL (vol%) UFL (vol%) 
Gasoline 50-90 kPa (varies according to climate, 
season and national legislation) 1.4 vol% 7.6 vol% 
Methanol 30 kPa 5.5 vol% 26.5 vol% 
* Data for gasoline is taken as Reid Vapour Pressure (RVP) measured @ 100 °C (38 °C), data for 
methanol have been computed by the first author for same the temperature for comparison. 
Table 1.  Properties for gasoline and methanol 
 
With this insight it is a relatively simple matter to compute the two temperatures of liquid 
methanol that are in equilibrium with methanol vapours corresponding to LFL and UFL.  
The results are shown in figure 1.   The conclusion is that there will be an ignitable 
atmosphere in a methanol tank if the temperature of the liquid methanol is within the 6-
35 °C range.   
With standard European climate conditions, this hazard is present most of the time.  For 
all practical matters, the vapour space in a methanol tank is rarely lean or rich. Most of 
the time it is ignitable, only waiting for an ignition source to explode violently.  This was 
the major finding in the 1994 case story, and it was a direct consequence of insights 
gained from the MARS data. 
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The hazard was unknown to the company A that sought permission to store methanol and 
it was also unknown to the local authorities (and, we believe, national authorities), who in 
both cases were familiar with the hazards of gasoline tanks.  It has probably also been 
unknown to the Competent Authorities (CA) that communicated the text of Short Report 
#113 and #233 and unknown to the MARS staff.  
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Figure 1.  Inherent explosion hazard of methanol storage.  Tank vapour space is ignitable 
if bulk liquid temperature is in the range 6-35 °C assuming ambient pressure of 1 bar. 
 
This case story illustrates what we described above as the second type of benefit (and 
first highlighted by van der Schaaf 1991) to be derived from accident information, 
namely modelling insight.  When acquiring knowledge about an accident we may gain 
insight into causal mechanisms which lead to a better modelling of the system.  We see 
how things are interrelated and how they may interact.  This knowledge may in turn 
prompt the development of “deep” knowledge of causal mechanisms or it may remain as 
shallow (but extremely useful) knowledge of limits and regularities.  
It is somewhat ironic that the accident report that contained the most meagre description, 
#133, and not the richer account of #233, gave rise to this insight. 
904.doc  Page 14 of 21 
 
MARS data motivates safety efforts 
In 1994, company A had vigorously claimed that it had no knowledge of prior accidents 
with methanol.  It was also quite obvious that the company considered the authority 
permit procedure to be overly cumbersome and exaggerated – and in general 
unnecessarily disruptive to their business.   
The information on prior accidents with methanol tanks came helpful to the CA field 
workers as it provided them with empirical evidence of the danger of explosions in 
methanol tanks.  The CA forwarded the case stories to company A and started asking 
questions why the company had no knowledge of these accidents.  Having started in a 
defensive mode, the CA now felt firm ground under their feet.  In this respect, the case 
story illustrates both “motivation” and “overview” (van der Schaaf et al.’s second and 
third categories, 1991). Thus, the motivation that stems from the realization that “but for 
the grace of God here go us” and the overview that comes from identifying 
commonalities across a range of examples. 
The 2005 case 
The series of events involved in the 2005 case described earlier appear identical in many 
respects to the 1994 case. (We have no first-hand knowledge of the 2005 case and our 
account is thus based on information). Company B wished to seize a business opportunity 
involving the sale of methanol and contracted with a speciality chemicals tank farm 
located in a harbour area in Denmark for storage and handling.  The locations and the CA 
(competent authorities) in the 1994 and 2005 cases differ. In both cases an existing 
gasoline tank is selected for the new methanol service.  It appears that little effort had 
been spent on hazard identification techniques when the case was described in the 
information submitted to the CA.  The CA processed the information and found that 
consequences of accidents were insufficiently addressed.  The CA therefore requested 
that the consequences of some specified leak scenarios should be estimated.  The CA did 
not specify internal explosion as a scenario to be computed.  Hence, it appears unlikely 
that the inherent internal explosion hazard of methanol tanks has been identified. So, 
whatever lessons the CA of one county learned in 1994 appears to be lost to the CA in 
another county in 2005. 
We have no information whether the CA in 2005 searched the MARS database before 
defining the  accident scenarios. But even if they had done so, we may hypothesise that, 
in the light of the rudimentary nature of the information in MARS, it seems highly 
improbable that the information in MARS would have been of any practical use to the 
CA in this case. 
Some of the weaknesses and strengths of the MARS database  
The MARS data on methanol accidents are rudimentary.  There is insufficient mention of 
designs and other relevant details.  However, the most critical shortcoming is the absence 
of results of systematic accident investigations which might lead to the identification of 
causes behind the accidents reported - rather than blank “lessons learned” fields.    
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Why are some descriptions superficial?  We have speculated if there could be a policy 
decision to give priority to the number of accidents reported (quantity) and therefore 
accept compromises on reporting protocol (quality).  The total number of records in 
MARS appears (June 7, 2006) to be 603.  At least, this is the number which is 
consistently returned when one performs a blank search within various fields such as 
start-date, substance-involved.  Thus the MARS database has accumulated about 600 
records during the 22 years it has existed since 1984 - corresponding to a little less than 
30 per year for the entire EU, or about two records per country per year3
Perhaps very strict scoping criteria may limit reporting (i.e., criteria that regulate which 
accidents fall within the category of mandatory reporting). As became apparent during 
the review of the glyoxylic acid case, it is conceivable that relevant major accidents may 
not enter the database because they fall outside the Seveso II legislation scope. 
.  This is not an 
overwhelming number.  So perhaps quantity cannot explain the lack of quality. 
But the most likely cause seems to be poor capture of primary data by member states.  As 
stated before, the MARS scheme is entirely dependent on member states to deliver useful 
input to the database.   
We have searched only the public domain of MARS data (Short Reports).  Full Reports 
are available only to national Competent Authorities as they contain confidential 
information, e.g. information that may reveal the identity of the country submitting the 
accident information.  It is in principle possible, that the Full Reports available to the 
authorities contain information that is superior to that contained in the Short Reports.  We 
have, however, interviewed a Danish MARS contact person who indicated that this was 
unlikely (Gerdes 2006).  Still, if it were to turn out that useful additional information is 
potentially available in the confidential Full Reports, we would argue that this could 
easily be rectified with the editing of the Short Reports.  From an accident prevention 
view it is obvious that information should be available in a format which is sufficiently 
detailed to allow for lessons to be learned.  Secrecy and accident prevention are not 
compatible. 
We emphasize that our findings do not warrant general conclusions on all records in the 
MARS database.  We have scrutinized only accidents involving methanol and have 
browsed a number of other reports.  Some of the Short Reports are evidently of high 
quality and are seemingly based on scrupulous application of professional accident 
investigation techniques.  Still, practical use of the MARS database reveals that Short 
Reports of poor quality are not limited to methanol accidents.  A search for “LPG or 
propane or butane", for instance, produces Short Reports with the same general problems 
as methanol.   
Our main conclusion is therefore, that there are considerable missed opportunities in the 
EU funded institutional support of learning from past industrial failures 
                                                 
 
3  In 1984 there were 10 member states in the EU.  In 1986 the number increased to 12, in 1995 to 15, and 
2004 to 25 member states.  For the period of interest here, there have been 12-15 member states in the EU. 
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Although the main tenor of the present paper could appear to be negative, the authors are 
in fact entirely supportive of the MARS database.  We strongly endorse the intentions 
behind its creation and find the efforts spent in running its operations commendable.  But 
we also think that the considerable literature that refers to the MARS system has been 
somewhat skewed:  We may have overlooked it, but we have not been able to find any 
mention in the 30 or so articles and reports we have read that describe the MARS system 
any mention of the poor quality of some reports.  The writing of this paper has been 
prompted by a wish to stimulate a debate about how best to improve the MARS system 
so that it may genuinely useful to safety analysts and practitioners and – in a wider sense 
– so that it may contribute to evolutionary learning. 
Finally, among the minor quibbles it deserves mention that the MARS search interface is 
overly complex and not user-friendly.  It is a major weakness that a free text search 
cannot be undertaken across all fields.  In the face of the relatively few records, and the 
nature of the data in at least some of the records, it would appear that a simple search 
facility might do justice to the information contained in the database of Short Reports. 
General relevance to biofuels (ethanol) 
Our case installation is very simple, the bulk storage of methanol in a fixed roof tank.  
We consider it likely that this type of installation exists in most EU member states.  
Therefore, it would have been of great practical value if the EU database had contained 
rich descriptions of methanol accidents and perhaps even identify the inherent explosion 
risks of methanol.  It would have been a prime candidate for evolutionary learning 
supported by information sharing.  This is clearly an opportunity foregone. 
A similar hazard analysis can be made for the bulk storage of ethanol which is subject to 
almost identical inherent internal explosion hazards.  With the groundswell interest in 
biofuels to reduce CO2 emissions from the transport sector the bulk storage of ethanol is 
likely to increase greatly in all EU member states. 
However, ethanol, unlike methanol, is not classified as a toxic, only as a flammable 
liquid.  Flammable liquids of that type4
We conducted a crude search in MARS for "ethanol".  The search returned two records 
(#379 and #393) concerning spectacular accidents precisely in which an ethanol tank 
suffered an internal explosion.  The reporting criteria in both cases were that damage 
exceeded 2 million ECU.  Both records are rich in text.  Neither record identifies the 
 are only subject to Seveso II regulations if the 
amount exceeds 5,000 tonnes and a safety report is only required if the amount exceeds 
50,000 tons (upper-tier).  It is quite conceivable that many bulk ethanol storage tanks 
therefore will not be subjected to Seveso II regulation unless of course they are part of a 
larger storage complex where other substances (typically gasoline, which have no 
inherent explosion risks), are stored in quantities that exceed the limits set in the 
directive.  Likewise, ethanol accidents may not be subjected to MARS reporting 
requirements unless the event is truly spectacular.  
                                                 
 
4  Classified as "highly flammable" according to annex 1, part 2, category 7b, in Directive 2003/105/EC 
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inherent internal explosion hazard of ethanol storage.  Neither record is informative on 
how to prevent such internal explosions - an obvious strategy could be to eliminate the 
formation of ignitable vapours in the first place, for instance using inert gas blanketing or 
other technical means.  But the accident descriptions are silent on this issue. 
We conclude that the current version of the Seveso directive does not address the inherent 
internal explosion risks of ethanol storage and that scope criteria may exclude this hazard 
from institutional support to evolutionary learning.  This is obviously an opportunity 
foregone. 
Comparing MARS and TAD accident data. 
We have compared the results of the MARS search with the results of a similar search in 
a well-known privately operated database The Accident Database (TAD).  
The TAD is not subjected to the relatively narrow Seveso scope restrictions and it 
contains far more records, about 13,000 compared to 600 in MARS.  The TAD database 
also contains transportation accident, including marine accidents and accidents on inland 
waterways, and it includes accidents outside the European Union.  Many of the TAD 
records suffer from the same shortcomings as the MARS records do.  However, several 
TAD records give a clear impression of having been written by persons with first hand 
knowledge of the incident, being rich in text and detailed.  The search procedure also 
permits free text searches in the entire database.  In summary, we consider TAD superior 
to MARS in practical accident prevention work.   
It is therefore extremely relevant to ask if the TAD database is more successful than the 
MARS database.  Intriguingly, this is not so.  Despite much targeted advertising in e.g. 
Loss Prevention Bulletin, the TAD has been unable to prove itself a viable commercial 
activity.  Due to little consumer interest and lack of revenue updating the database with 
new incidents and even basic software maintenance has been discontinued.  (Smith 2006, 
personal communication).  The database is still for sale, but for practical reasons it is no 
longer a living database, it has become a historical archive. 
Improvement potential 
We have not undertaken a comprehensive analysis of all records in the MARS system 
and will only address some of the obstacles that have to be cleared to make the learning 
potential fully operative.  Insofar as there are problems with poor quality of primary data 
capture from member states, MARS could offer a sparring service to improve the 
accident investigation and reporting efforts.   
It could also be suggested to ease secrecy.  When member states cannot be identified in 
the Short Report it is impossible for safety professionals to seek more elaborate 
information on a specific incident.  The possible embarrassment of member states if they 
are identified with records of poor quality could also have a preventive effect.  We repeat 
that secrecy and accident prevention are seldom compatible. 
Finally we propose an active alert service with the broadest possible dissemination of 
lessons learned.  In practice this means distribution of alerts and analyses on the internet, 
904.doc  Page 18 of 21 
 
for instance as done  by the well-known Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting 
Programme (CHIRP)5
CONCLUSION 
 in the UK.  Originally, CHIRP covered aviation incidents only but 
it has been extended to maritime incidents in recent years.  A number of other highly 
respected systems for collecting, analysing and disseminating lessons learned exist 
(Beaubien & Baker, 2002), and an overhaul of the MARS system should be based on a 
careful review of the best features from the more successful programmes in safety critical 
domains. 
Our case example with bulk methanol storage has shown that the data in some of the 
Short Reports in MARS have a number of serious shortcomings.  Causes are not 
identified and lessons learned are left blank.  The value of this information in the efforts 
to prevent future methanol accidents is limited - but not nil.   
Our case also demonstrates that even the most rudimentary data on past accidents can be 
of value in accident prevention.  Ironically, it was the Short Report in MARS with the 
most meagre data that gave inspiration to an accident causation hypothesis which 
eventually proved useful.  Also, the mere knowledge of past accidents undermined the 
Company’s assertion that it had no knowledge of any accidents involving the bulk 
storage of methanol.   
Over the course of 22 years the EU database has only accumulated about 600 Short 
Reports for all its member states.  We consider it unlikely that this number represents all 
“major accidents” according to a common sense definition of this concept for such a large 
territory.  We hypothesise if scope limitations imposed by strict legal interpretation of the 
Seveso legislation may be counter productive and perhaps even self-defeating for the 
Seveso legislation’s stated objective of accident prevention through information sharing. 
We have identified 110 academic citations that mention the MARS major accident 
reporting system.  The ratio of citations to accident records is 1:6, a very large ratio.  We 
have not reviewed all 600 Short Reports in MARS, but our samples indicate problems of 
quality in some of the data.  We support wholeheartedly the intentions behind the 
creation and operation of the MARS database and have never found any reason to have 
other than respect for the personnel and institution involved in its operation. Still, we find 
it a cause of concern that sample searches do not seem to reveal rich material for potential 
learning and, perhaps just as important, that these problems of poor information seem to 
be largely absent from the bulk of scientific papers and reports that describe and refer to 
the MARS database.  
We emphasize that our methanol case example does not warrant general conclusions on 
the entire MARS database.  However, we consider it likely that this type of installation 
can be found in most, if not all member states and we argue that it would have been of 
                                                 
 
5  http://www.chirp.co.uk/main/default.asp 
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great practical value if MARS had contained richer accident descriptions, identified 
underlying causes and pointed to efficient preventive measures.  We pursue a similar 
argument in our ethanol tank case - an issue which we foresee will be of increasing 
importance to all member states due to the groundswell interest in biofuels.  
We conclude that there are substantial opportunities foregone in the EU funded scheme 
that provides institutional support for evolutionary learning.   
We have undertaken a comparative analysis of accident records in MARS and in the 
commercially available TAD.  TAD suffers from many of the same fundamental 
shortcomings as do MARS.  On all parameters, however, the TAD seems to be superior 
to MARS in practical accident prevention work.  It is noteworthy, and intriguing, that 
despite much targeted advertising there has been very limited consumer interest in TAD.  
TAD has failed to be commercially viable and is now in a dormant state.  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine or speculate about the reasons for this.  
Echoing the title of Kletz’ 2003 publication, ”Still going wrong”, we acknowledge that 
there are many barriers to evolutionary learning.  We conclude by emphasising, however, 
that the value of accident reporting schemes is not only determined by the quality of the 
data they contain but that institutional support appears to be crucial to sheer survivability.   
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